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Abstract 
In this paper I investigate the effects of recent debt relief initiatives such as the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Debt Initiative of 1996 on resource 
flows to developing countries. Focusing on a sample of low-income countries, I 
concentrate on the following questions. First, is the HIPC initiative selective in the 
sense of “rewarding” improved policies in HIPC countries with higher transfers? 
Measuring improvement directly with dummy variables representing progress in 
the initiative, I find that good macroeconomic management does not seem to 
matter in terms of the level of resource transfers and foreign aid received by a 
HIPC country. Second, have HIPCs and non-HIPCs experienced reductions in 
aid inflows (other than debt relief) in the 1990s and early 2000s? My estimates 
suggest that countries classified as HIPCs received higher (official and aggregate) 
net transfers than non-HIPC countries in the first half of the 1990s. These 
differences persist after 1996, however, at a lower level. Looking at net official 
development assistance, differences between HIPC countries and non-HIPC 
countries persist throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, with higher levels of aid 
going to HIPC countries. Third, have the debt relief initiatives in the 1990s 
provided additional resources to low-income countries? Confirming findings in 
earlier literature, my results suggest that aid flows have not changed significantly in 
response to debt relief.   
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1 Introduction 
"This initiative [HIPC] is a breakthrough ... It deals with debt in a comprehensive way to give countries the 
possibility of exiting from unsustainable debt. It is very good news for the poor of the world." 
James D. Wolfensohn, President, World Bank
1 
 
In the second half of the last decade, the call for debt relief or cancellation as well as poverty 
reduction in developing countries grew very loud. Apart from NGOs like Oxfam and 
Jubilee2000, prominent figures like the Pope, the Dalai Lama, and the Irish pop singer Bono 
were demanding a solution to the debt problems of poor countries. The Paris Club of 
Creditors and the international financial institutions – the IMF and the World Bank – 
responded to the public pressure by establishing the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) Debt Initiative in 1996, and the Enhanced HIPC Debt Initiative in 1999. Also, the 
United Nations General Assembly adopted the Millennium Development Goals in 
September 2000, calling for, among other things, a worldwide eradication of extreme poverty 
and hunger. 
The focus of my paper is on the effects of recent debt relief initiatives, such as the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Debt Initiative of 1996, on resource flows to developing 
countries. My sample covers 66 low-income countries (most of them located in Sub-Saharan 
Africa) over the period 1989 to 2002
2. Forty of these low-income countries are classified by 
the World Bank as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries.   
First, I investigate whether the HIPC initiative is selective in the sense of “rewarding” 
improved policies in HIPC countries with higher transfers. Instead of using a policy index, I 
use a novel approach to measure good policy. The HIPC initiative is explicitly designed to 
                                                      
1 Quote taken from http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/about/hipcbr/hipcbr.htm 
2 For a list of the countries, see table 1 in the appendix. 
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reward good macroeconomic performance by conditioning debt relief on the 
implementation of key reforms. I use this characteristic of the initiative, and classify country 
observations by the progress made in the initiative, i.e., whether and when they qualify for 
debt relief. Earlier literature suggests that foreign aid is more effective in promoting growth 
when allocated to countries with good policies, rather than according to strategic and 
political interests.  
Second, I ask whether HIPC and Non-HIPC countries are treated differently in terms of aid 
allocation in an environment of declining aid flows. In this context, I also compare the 
differences before and after 1996 – the year of the announcement of the HIPC initiative. 
This is an important policy question, because redistribution of resource flows towards HIPC 
countries can potentially distort incentives for ineligible countries. If the economic situation 
of the eligible countries improves dramatically without a significant effort in implementing 
key reforms, ineligible countries have an incentive to achieve HIPC status. 
Third, in following earlier literature, I investigate whether debt relief provides additional 
resources to low-income countries between 1989 and 2002. It has been argued that in the 
past, bilateral donors have often given aid in order to keep their debtors out of arrears, i.e., 
some of the aid money was used to pay back debt owed to multilateral and bilateral donors
3. 
One of the goals of the HIPC debt initiative is to break this “aid recycling”, and to provide 
additional resources to the eligible countries
4. If debt relief is additional, ineligible countries 
are again in a moral hazard situation. 
Addressing these three issues in an empirical analysis, I find that, first, good macroeconomic 
management does not seem to matter in the HIPC initiative in terms of the level of resource 
transfers and foreign aid received by a country. Second, my estimates suggest that countries 
classified as HIPCs received higher (official and aggregate) net transfers than non-HIPC 
countries in the early 1990s. These differences persist after 1996, however at a lower level. 
                                                      
3 See, for example, Birdsall (2002) about the politics of foreign aid in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
4 “A key concept underlying the HIPC Initiative - that of additionality - is that debt relief should supplement, 
not replace, the flow of assistance in the form of grants and concessional loans to the poorest countries.”,   
quote from: HIPC initiative: Status of Implementation, page 9, IMF, April 2002. 
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Looking at net official development assistance, differences between HIPC countries and 
non-HIPC countries persist throughout the 1990s and early 2000s with higher levels of aid 
going to HIPC countries. In this sense, resources have been allocated towards non-HIPC 
countries. Third, confirming earlier literature on additionality, debt relief initiatives in the 
1990s did not affect aid inflows significantly for low-income countries, neither positively nor 
negatively. Hence, debt relief did not crowd out aid.  
In section 2, I briefly review literature on the historical background of the debt crisis in low-
income countries and the HIPC Debt Initiative. The third section describes the main issues, 
the methodology, and the data used in the paper. In the fourth section, I describe my 




2.1  Brief history of the low-income country debt crisis 
The situation of low income countries in the last 35 years and until the mid 1990s can 
broadly be characterized as one with an increasing debt stock, increasing debt service, 
positive and increasing aggregate and official transfers, and increasing foreign aid (all in per 
capita terms).
5 External borrowing increased significantly in the 1970s and 1980s, when 
creditor governments provided export credits to developing countries in order to increase 
their own exports. Low income countries – unlike the middle-income Latin American 
countries – had to rely on official loans, since their access to private capital markets was very 
limited
6.  
During this period, export credit guarantees were considered part of the overall development 
strategy pursued by developed nations. The debt burden of low income countries steadily 
                                                      
5 See figures 1 to 4, and 7 in section 7. 
6 For a brief historical overview of the low income countries’ debt crisis, see Daseking and Powell (1999). 
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increased, and their overall financial situation deteriorated because of adverse terms of trade 
shocks, weaknesses in the management of debt, lack of adjustment to an evolving economic 
environment, as well as political factors such as wars and social unrest. 
The international financial community’s reaction to the unfolding debt crisis in the 1980s 
differed for middle-income and low-income countries. The Baker Plan
7 of the mid-1980s 
was mainly directed at middle-income Latin American countries and some African 
countries
8. The prevalent paradigm at the time was that the debt crisis was a problem of 
(temporary) illiquidity, and that countries could “grow out of debt”, given temporary debt 
servicing relief. Under the Baker Plan, it was assumed that a rescheduling of debt
9 without 
any adjustment in its net present value would bring about a solution. New lending would 
lead to increased investment, which would eventually lead to greater economic growth. 
Hence, the proposed solution was a flow rescheduling of debt, and provision of “new 
money” by commercial banks and creditor governments, conditional on the implementation 
of an IMF-approved structural adjustment program. The lack of IMF-approved adjustment 
programs and the Brazilian debt moratorium in 1987 made clear that the Baker Plan was not 
adequate. In the meantime, commercial banks started setting aside loan-loss reserves, while 
the share of the debt owed to official creditors increased. With regard to low income 
countries, the reaction of the international community to the debt crisis was to provide 
comprehensive non-concessional flow reschedulings through the Paris Club creditors and 
several multilateral agencies. Commercial banks played only a minor role. 
In the late 1980s – in an environment where the secondary market value of sovereign debt 
of many low and middle income countries was significantly below its face value – the 
paradigm shifted from one of a liquidity problem to a “debt overhang” problem. The 
concept of debt overhang is defined as the ''presence of an existing 'inherited' debt 
                                                      
7 The plan was named after the then U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, James Baker. 
8 See Cline (1995). 
9 A (flow) rescheduling of debt means that interest and principal payments are postponed for some period in 
the hope that economic growth in the meantime will make it easier for the debtor to repay the debt. 
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sufficiently large that creditors do not expect with confidence to be fully repaid''
10 The idea is 
that there is a “debt Laffer curve”, in the sense that the net present value of repayments is 
increased when debt relief is provided. Krugman (1988) and Sachs (1986) argued that highly 
indebted poor countries were on the “wrong side” of this curve. They suggest that in this 
situation, countries’ incentives to invest domestically (and therefore to increase the available 
surplus used for debt repayment) are distorted, since the high stock of debt acts like a high 
marginal tax on that investment.  
This shift in paradigm led to the Brady Plan
11 in 1989, which used market-oriented debt 
reduction schemes, such as debt buybacks and equity swaps, to solve the debt crisis. Again, 
mainly Latin American countries were involved. Commercial banks used this opportunity to 
leave the market by making use of their previously accumulated loan-loss reserves. Around 
the same time, the notion of debt overhang gained prominence among policy makers in 
dealing with debt of low income countries. An initiative by the Paris Club, that later becomes 
known as “Toronto Terms”, included an option that allowed debt rescheduling on a 
concessional basis, meaning that “below market” interest rates were charged on rescheduled 
debt. In the following years, the concessionality of debt reschedulings by the Paris Club of 
Creditors deepened. For example, the “Naples terms” agreed upon by the Paris Club in 1994 
provided debt relief of up to 67% on bilateral debt.  
2.2  HIPC Debt Initiative and related literature 
There are several factors that distinguish the HIPC debt initiative from previous initiatives 
by the Paris Club
12. One distinguishing factor is that for the first time multilateral debt owed 
to the IMF and the World Bank is eligible for debt relief. Second, the implementation of the 
initiative involves all actors – creditors, donors, and debtors, as well as NGOs and churches. 
Especially in the Enhanced HIPC Initiative in 1999, involvement and active participation of 
                                                      
10 See Krugman (1988). 
11 The plan was named after then US treasury secretary Nicolas Brady. 
12 The Paris Club initatives are also called “traditional debt relief mechanisms”. 
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civic society plays an important role in the design of the required Poverty-Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP).  
The goal of the HIPC debt initiative is twofold. First, its purpose is to provide a permanent 
exit from debt renegotiations and rescheduling, and to lower the eligible country’s debt stock 
to a sustainable level. This is to be achieved by removing the debt overhang through debt 
relief in order to promote economic growth. Second, a combination of debt relief and 
foreign aid should provide additional resources for increased social spending in 
infrastructure, primary education, health, and to reduce poverty in general. In this paper, I 
describe debt relief as additional if it leads to additional resources made available to the 
individual debtor receiving debt relief. The goal of additionality is explicitly incorporated in 
the Enhanced HIPC Debt Initiative in 1999.
13,14 
Under the original 1996 HIPC initiative, debt sustainability is the key goal. Countries that are 
considered as potentially eligible generally have no access to private capital markets, and are 
only able to borrow from the International Development Association (IDA), the 
concessional lending arm of the World Bank. Once a country is classified as eligible for 
HIPC debt relief, it enters a two-stage process: First, an agreement is made with the World 
Bank and the IMF about key structural reforms. After a 3-year track record of good 
performance, the country reaches the “decision point”, where the Paris Club and other 
bilateral creditors provide debt relief of up to 80% on eligible debt, and the multilateral 
creditors provide funds through the structural adjustment program. Second, after another 3-
year track record of good performance, the “completion point” is reached Deeper stock-of-
debt relief is then provided. Since this process is described as “too little, too late” by the 
official review
15 of the HIPC initiative in October 1998, the Enhanced HIPC Debt Initiative 
                                                      
13 “… the debt-servicing capacity of HIPCs depends not only on their ability to generate foreign exchange 
through exports, but also on how much foreign assistance is expected to be forthcoming in the future…”, 
quote from Claessens et al. (1997). 
14 “…the enhanced HIPC initiative will boost social spending…”, quote from 
http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/progress-to-date/May99v3/may99v3.htm 
15 see International Monetary Fund and World Bank (1998). 
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was created in 1999. The thresholds for eligibility
16 are lower and the process simplified and 
accelerated. Debt relief is provided once some of the key reforms are implemented. A 3-year 
track record of good performance is no longer required. Also, poverty reduction is now 
explicitly included as a goal
17. 
Some argue that highly indebted countries engage in “aid recycling” – with the full awareness 
and support of their donor countries – meaning that a share of official aid flows is used to 
repay old debt. The underlying reason for this behavior is to keep the debtor countries out 
of arrears on multilateral debt, since that could potentially lead to a withdrawal of funds by 
the donor community as a whole. Under these circumstances, debt relief can provide a way 
out of this vicious circle, and eliminate aid recycling altogether. And if the aid budget is not 
adjusted for the foregone debt repayments, debt relief is additional. Hence, debt relief also 
provides an opportunity to correct distorted incentive structures by freeing up part of the aid 
budget of the donor country, which then can distribute those “extra funds” to countries with 
good institutional structures and sound policies.  
Since I am interested in the link between debt relief and foreign aid, I turn first to the aid 
allocation literature, which investigates the motivation and determinants of aid allocation. 
Schraeder et al. (1998) find that different determinants of aid allocation are important for 
different donors. The authors suggest that U.S. foreign aid policy in the 1980s is mostly 
driven by strategic (Cold War) interests, mainly in the Middle East. However, they also find a 
positive relationship between aid to some African countries and US trade with these 
countries. For France, colonial ties play an important role. Sweden’s foreign aid allocation in 
the 1980s seems to be driven by ideological affinity of recipient countries as well as 
economic interests (again, there is a positive link between aid and trade). Alesina and Dollar 
(2000) investigates the same question with data from 1970 to 1994. The authors find that 
political and strategic considerations play at least as big a role in allocating foreign aid as 
economic need and “good policies” in recipient countries. In the Scandinavian countries, the 
                                                      
16 A country becomes classified as a HIPC once the net present value of the debt-to-export ratio exceeds 150% 
(previously 200-250% on a case-by-case basis) and the debt-to-revenue ratio exceeds 250% (previously 280%).  
17 For a more detailed overview on the design of the HIPC initiative, see Boote and Thugge (1997). 
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humanitarian aspect of aid dominates. Again, France puts more weight on colonial ties, while 
foreign aid policy in the US is dominated by strategic interests in the Middle East, with 
Egypt and Israel being the main aid recipients. This kind of behavior by some of the major 
donor countries clearly distorts the incentives of developing countries, since the rewards for 
“good policies” are small or non-existent. Furthermore, democratization increases aid flows, 
while foreign direct investment (FDI) responds more to economic factors like trade 
liberalization and improved property rights. McGillivray (2003) questions the methodology 
of earlier literature on aid allocation and suggests that the importance of strategic 
considerations for aid allocation during the cold war period is overstated. He argues that aid 
allocation might have been driven by developmental criteria all along despite contrary results 
in earlier literature.
18 
Aid allocation and its effectiveness are interrelated. Recent literature emphasizes “good 
policy” as the most important factor for aid to be effective in the sense of being growth-
enhancing. Burnside and Dollar (2000) is a widely cited and influential paper in this 
literature. Its authors find aid to be effective in promoting growth if a country’s fiscal, 
monetary and trade policies are sound. Svensson (1999) finds that a higher degree of political 
freedom and civil liberties makes aid more effective in promoting growth. Collier and Dollar 
(1998) suggest that 10 million people annually could be lifted out of poverty if aid would be 
allocated to poor, “good policy” countries, rather than to satisfy strategic, political and 
commercial interests. In a critique on the recent aid effectiveness literature, Easterly (2003) 
points out that the significant positive link between aid (conditional on good policies) and 
growth disappears when the original data set of the Burnside and Dollar (2000) paper is 
extended. Furthermore, Easterly (2001) questions the strong link between good policies and 
higher growth rates. Controlling for other factors, he finds that growth rates in developing 
countries have stagnated in the 80s and 90s, even though a number of typical policy 
measures have improved. He speculates that the increased level of indebtedness in 
developing countries may have been a reason for such stagnation.  
                                                      
18 See, for example, Maizels and Nissanke (1984), McKinlay (1978), McKinlay and Little (1979).  
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If high indebtedness alone is really an impediment to growth, as argued in the debt overhang 
literature, debt relief might then be a possible solution. As previously described, proponents 
of the debt overhang theory argue that the removal of the debt overhang corrects distorted 
incentives for domestic investment.
19 Bird and Milne (2003) caution, however, that providing 
debt relief to highly indebted countries might simply redistribute resources to countries with 
a history of unsound macroeconomic policies. Hence, “bad policies” in the past would be 
rewarded ex-post by providing debt relief. The authors also question whether there is a debt 
overhang problem in low-income countries. They find that more highly indebted countries 
receive more official net transfers, not less. Hence, incentives might not be distorted for 
domestic investment. Easterly (2002) argues that debt relief initiatives in the past two 
decades have not helped the situation of HIPC countries. In some instances, these initiatives 
might even have promoted behavior worsening the debt situation of these countries.  
Apart from the effects of debt relief on incentives, another concern is that debt relief might 
crowd out foreign aid receipts. For example, Cohen (2000) is concerned that aid flows will 
be cut as a result of the HIPC initiative. He argues that the nominal figures of debt relief 
overstate the true amount of additional resources available to poor countries. A “splitting 
up” of the accounting of debt relief is suggested: One part is the cleaning of the books of 
donor countries, i.e., a write-down of the debt that could not have been expected to be paid 
back. A second part will be accounting for the actual additional resources that become 
available through debt relief. Based on the Brady deals in the 1980s, Cohen attempts to 
estimate the market values of the debt of HIPC countries in order to answer the question 
how much debt was expected to be repaid. Hence, only debt relief that goes beyond the 
market value will provide additional resources to the HIPC countries. He finds that the 
market value of HIPC debt is far below its face value or net present value. Since HIPC debt 
relief is based on net present values, he warns against decreasing aid flows after the provision 
of debt relief. Furthermore, Sachs et al. (1999) lament the volatility of grants and new loans 
making planning for the developing countries harder. 
 
                                                      
19 See Krugman (1988) and Sachs (1986). 
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3  Empirical Model and Data Sources 
There has been little empirical research on the direct implications of the HIPC initiative on 
resource flows to the eligible countries. Powell (2003) investigates whether debt relief 
activities lead to a decrease in aid flows received by low-income countries. He states that 
debt relief and aid allocation decisions were kept largely separate in the past, and are usually 
dealt with by different ministries in the donor countries (this has changed in recent years, 
however). Where this is the case, we should expect that in donor countries debt relief will 
not have much influence on aid budgets (at least in the short-run). Looking at data for 60 
“IDA-only” countries
20 from 1996 to 2000, Powell finds that neither the level of official 
development assistance (ODA) nor official net transfers received is affected by debt relief 
provided by official and multilateral creditors. Hence, there seems to be additionality (in the 
sense the term is used in this paper). In his empirical analysis, the factors that do play a role 
in determining aid flows to a country are population size, and whether an IMF program is in 
place.  
Birdsall et al. (2003) are mainly concerned about “selectivity”, meaning whether donors will 
be selective and provide more aid to countries with good macroeconomic management. The 
authors use a sample of 37 Sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1977 to 1998. The 
countries are categorized into three groups: low debt countries, high debt countries with low 
multilateral debt, and high debt countries with high multilateral debt. As a variable for policy 
performance, they use the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA) data,
21  and alternatively, the policy index created by Burnside and Dollar (2000), 
which is based on publicly available data. They find that policy seems to matter little in 
determining net transfers. Only if interacted with the country category, policy matters. High 
multilateral debt countries receive higher net transfers when their policies are bad. 
                                                      
20 As previously mentioned these countries only receive loans from the International Development Association 
(the concessional lending arm of the World Bank) and usually have no access to private capital markets. 
21 The CPIA data set is not publicly available.  It contains 20 components that can be grouped into 4 
subgroups: Macroeconomic policies, structural policies, public sector management, and social inclusion. 
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3.1  Main Issues, Data and Methodology 
In this paper, I assess the resource impact of debt relief on HIPC and non-HIPC countries 
before and after the implementation of the HIPC debt initiative in 1996. As mentioned 
previously, one of the goals of the HIPC debt initiative is to provide additional resources for 
social spending to the eligible countries. Again, the definition of additionality used in this 
paper is the following: There is full additionality if the net aid flow increases by the amount 
of debt relief granted. Whether there is additionality is an important policy question because 
poverty can only be reduced successfully if there are funds available. Since debt relief and 
foreign aid are imperfect substitutes, debt relief by itself, however, will not necessarily 
provide these additional resources. For example, suppose that – before debt relief is 
provided – part of the available aid budget is used to sustain the flow of debt service 
payments (i.e., “aid recycling” is present); in that situation, only a combination of debt relief 
and an aid budget that is not fully adjusted by the amount of debt relief leads to additional 
resources for the recipient countries. Another important and related issue is that of 
selectivity: Are HIPC countries with good macroeconomic policies “rewarded” by receiving 
more transfers than countries that qualify for the HIPC program, but are unsuccessful (or 
unwilling) in implementing reforms? I.e., will aid donors be more selective in the sense of 
giving aid conditional on good policy rather than according to their strategic or political interests 
as they have done in the past?  
In order to address these issues, I investigate donor behavior using data on aggregate net 
transfers, official net transfers, and net official development assistance (net ODA) for 66 
low-income countries – of which 40 countries are HIPC countries – over the time period 
1989 to 2002. All debt-related and GDP data come from the World Bank’s Global 
Development Finance 2004 data set. Population data are taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 2004. Data on net official development assistance (ODA) are taken 
from the OECD’s International Development Statistics 2004. I also use data from Annual 
Freedom in the World Country Ratings 1972 through 2003 by Freedom House. 
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My sample consists of 66 “IDA-only” countries
22. As previously mentioned, “IDA-only” 
generally means that a country has no access to private capital markets. I chose this 
restriction for two main reasons. First, the classification by the World Bank as “IDA-only” is 
a prerequisite for eligibility for the HIPC Debt Initiative. Second, since the HIPC initiative 
only deals with official bilateral and multilateral debt, choosing a set of countries with little if 
any private debt appears to be consistent with this criterion. 
3.1.1 Descriptive  Statistics 
Table 2a compares the average values of the variables used in the regressions for HIPC and 
non-HIPC countries. The time period is split in 1996 when the original HIPC initiative is 
announced. The table provides a good comparison of the main characteristics of these two 
sets of countries Per capita GDPs were similar for the first period, but increased much faster 
in non-HIPC countries in the late 1990s and early 2000s. We see that debt stock and debt 
service have decreased significantly for the HIPCs, while both measures increased for non-
HIPC countries. Furthermore, official development assistance for non-HIPCs dropped 
much more substantially (from about 4.5% of GDP to 2.3 % vs. 9.7% to 7.9% for HIPC 
countries), suggesting that in relative terms foreign aid might have been shifted away from 
non-HIPCs. As we would expect, relief and reductions in debt are much higher for HIPC 
countries after 1996, but they are also much higher before the implementation of the HIPC 
initiative.
 23  
In table 2b, we have the same measures for two HIPC countries, Uganda and Ghana. 
Uganda received all treatments and successfully completed both the original and enhanced 
HIPC debt initiative. Ghana on the other hand reached the decision point of the enhanced 
HIPC initiative only in February 2002, and received debt relief after that. Hence, those two 
countries are a good example for a comparison of a country with a very good record in 
implementing key structural reforms (Uganda) and a country with a mediocre record 
                                                      
22 The International Development Association (IDA) provides interest-free loans and some grants to the 
world’s poorest countries. IDA-only” 
23 All countries in the sample received some debt relief in the 1990s through the Paris Club. 
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(Ghana). Whether the HIPC debt initiative framework is responsible for all (or at least most) 
of the differences between those two countries is an open question, and beyond the scope of 
this paper. Nonetheless, the emerging pattern is suggestive. While Ghana’s per capita GDP 
dropped by about 6 %, Uganda experienced an increase of about 21 %. The significant drop 
in debt service for Uganda is reflected by the massive increase in debt service relief. We also 
see the debt stock increasing rapidly in Ghana, from 77 % of GDP to almost 107%, while 
Uganda’s situation improves significantly. The comparison of these two countries suggests 
that policy performance is rewarded under the HIPC initiative. I will test this more 
rigorously in section 4. 
The dependent variables used in the following analysis are aggregate net transfers, official net 
transfers, and official development assistance, respectively. Net official development 
assistance (net ODA) is the first dependent variable considered. Funds being classified as 
ODA have to satisfy three criteria: First, they are provided by an official agency; second, the 
purpose of the assistance is economic development; and third, the assistance contains a grant 
element of at least 25 percent.
24 Debt relief, which – under OECD guidelines – is recorded 
as ODA is netted out for the purpose of my regressions. The second dependent variable 
used is official net transfers. These transfers consist of the sum of official net flows on long-
term debt to official creditors, plus official grants minus official interest payments on long-
term loans. Highly indebted poor countries have received positive official net transfers in the 
past; therefore it is interesting to see whether and how debt relief influenced these transfers. 
Finally, I use aggregate net transfers as a dependent variable. These transfers consist of net 
foreign direct investment, net portfolio equity flows, and official grants minus interest 
payments on long-term debt and FDI profits. All dependent variables, as well as debt stock, 
debt service, debt service and debt stock reduction, and OECD debt relief are measured as 
ratios of GDP.  
                                                      
24 Using ODA as a direct measure for “foreign aid” has been criticized by several authors, mainly because of 
the arbitrary calculation of the grant element of concessional loans. See, for example, Chang et al. (1998), and 
Renard and Cassimon (2003).  
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3.1.2 Benchmark  Regression 
First, I investigate whether HIPC countries are treated differently compared to non-HIPC 
countries before and after 1996. As a benchmark, I start with a regression that includes only 
dummy variables: 
(1)  ,1 2 , 3 96 96 _ it i it t it Y hipc hipc post time dummies , α δδ δ η =+× +× +× + × + ε
,
 
As described above,   stands for official net transfers, aggregate net transfers and official 
development assistance, respectively. The coefficient on hipc tells us what the difference in 
transfers per GDP between HIPC and non-HIPC countries is on average before 1996. The 
coefficient on hipc96 is the change in transfers per GDP for HIPCs since the start of the 
HIPC initiative in 1996 relative to before 1996. Hence, the sum of hipc and hipc96 represents 
the difference between HIPC and non-HIPC countries in 1996 to 2002. Lastly, the dummy 
variable post96 helps distinguish the transfer levels between 1989 to 1995 and 1996 to 2002. 
, it Y
3.1.3  Regression including Main Determinants of Transfers/Foreign Aid 
In a second approach, I first estimate the following equation, including the determinants 
used in the earlier literature:  
(2)  t ,, 1 23 96 96 _ it it i i t i Y X hipc hipc post time dummies α βδ δ δ η =+× +× +× +× + × + ε
                                                     
 
Again, the same dependent variables are used. X is a vector of the following variables: debt 
stock, debt service, logarithm of GDP, a country’s share of the total population of the 
sample countries, debt stock and debt service reduction, an OECD debt relief variable, and a 
variable called “freedom”, which is an index composed of the average of a political rights 
and a civic liberties indicator value.
25 
When running the regression with ODA as the left-hand side variable, I use the variable 
“OECD debt relief” as an alternative measure of debt relief
26. As noted in previous 
 
25 Both are on a scale from 1 to 7, where a higher number means less “free”. 
26 It is also taken from the OECD’s International Development Statistics 2004 data set. 
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literature, using this OECD measure for debt relief is not ideal
27. It will only provide a lower 
bound for debt relief because of the different reporting approaches among creditors. Some 
countries report the amount of debt relief only when a payment should have fallen due (i.e., 
over the lifetime of the loan that was forgiven), others report the total amount of debt relief 
in the year when it was granted.  
Following Powell (2003), I control for the political environment in a country with the 
variable “freedom”. This variable captures some institutional and political aspects in those 
countries.
28 The logarithm of GDP is included as a measure of poverty, since headcount data 
on poverty are not reliable in early years.
29 Previous studies have found that there is a small 
country bias, meaning that smaller countries tend to receive an over-proportional share of 
transfers. To control for this, I use the share of the total population of the sample. 
3.1.4  Regressions distinguishing HIPC by Policy Performance 
In my last set of regressions, I replace the dummy variable hipc96 with a set of dummy 
variables that are proxies for a HIPC’s progress within the debt initiative. As previously 
described, the two HIPC initiatives are multi-stage processes, where each of them has a 
decision and a completion point. The dummy variables each signify a particular level of 
progress, describing which points have been reached. These variables can be seen as a 
measure of good policy, because progress in the HIPC initiative is equivalent with 
implementing key structural reforms under IMF and World Bank guidance. The use of these 
dummy variables therefore tells us whether “good policy” is rewarded with higher transfers 
within the HIPC initiative.  
The following model is being estimated: 
                                                      
27 For a discussion, see Powell (2003). 
28 Using the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment data would be preferable, but – as 
previously mentioned – this data set is not publicly available. 
29 See Birdsall (2002). 
 
15Revised: January 2005 
(3)   
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ηε
=
=+× +× +× +× + ×
+× +
∑ ,
                                                     
The dummies for hipc_stage_n will tell us exactly how far a country has advanced at any point 
in time. The coefficient here is interpreted as the difference in transfers received by a 
country reaching a certain stage in this process and those of a HIPC country that has not 
advanced in the process. 
 
4 Empirical  Evidence 
As mentioned earlier, my analysis focuses on these questions: First, is there any differential 
treatment for HIPC countries in comparison to the other low-income countries in the 
sample before and after the announcement and implementation of the HIPC debt initiative 
in 1996? Second, is aid allocation more selective within the HIPC countries, i.e., does 
relatively more aid go to “good policy” countries? Third, is debt relief additional? In terms of 
coefficients, I focus on the coefficients of hipc, hipc96 and the policy performance dummies 
hipc_stage_n.
30  
4.1  Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
Official development assistance comes closest to what is generally understood as foreign aid. 
In Figure 3, we see that – in per capita terms – more and more ODA is flowing to HIPC 
countries, while in non-HIPC countries, the per capita amounts increase slowly. When 
measured as a share of GDP (see Figure 4), ODA falls significantly faster  between 1995 and 
1997 for HIPC than for non-HIPC countries, temporarily narrowing the gap between the 
two groups of countries. However, the gap is increasing again from 1998 onwards. This is at 
least suggestive evidence that the HIPC debt relief initiative might be working in terms of 
providing additional (concessional) resources to the eligible countries.  
 
30 The variation of the variables is weighted by population size in order to minimize the influence of small island nations on 
the regression results. 
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The regression results for net ODA as the dependent variable are reported in Table 3. When 
using ordinary least squares and random effects, I find that HIPC countries receive more 
assistance than non-HIPC countries (by approximately 5% and 9% of GDP, respectively) 
before 1996. When going beyond the benchmark regression, there is only a significant 
change in 1996 to 2002 when using OLS, suggesting that this difference drops by around 3% 
to a 2% difference between HIPCs and non-HIPCs. In the fixed effects approach, hipc96 is 
not significant. Looking at the coefficients of the policy performance variables hipc_state_n, 
no clear picture emerges. If foreign aid is allocated selectively, we would expect positive 
coefficients for all these policy dummies. Only the coefficients associated with the enhanced 
HIPC initiative are (mostly) positive, but almost none significantly so. This suggests that 
policy performance has at best no effect and at worst a negative impact on foreign aid flows 
to a HIPC country. 
The coefficient of debt service per GDP is positive and highly significant for all three 
estimation techniques, suggesting that countries with a higher debt service burden receive 
more foreign aid. Only in the fixed effects approach, does a high debt stock lead to 
significantly lower foreign aid. A higher GDP is consistently linked with lower foreign aid. 
Since log(GDP) is our proxy for poverty, we would expect that a poorer country receives 
more foreign aid. The coefficient of OECD debt relief is positive, but not robust. Hence, 
debt relief does not crowd out aid flows. The population share variable is highly significant 
in all three specifications, but – unlike the other two approaches – the fixed effect model 
results in a negative coefficient. Hence, it is not clear whether there is a “small country bias”. 
4.2  Official Net Transfers 
After increasing for about two decades, per capita official net transfers to HIPC countries 
started declining throughout the 1990s (see Figure 5). In the mid-90s, these transfers 
dropped to the level of non-HIPC countries. Figure 6, which is in absolute dollar terms, 
shows a similar picture – falling transfers to HIPCs until the mid-90s, stabilizing and then 
increasing. Transfers to non-HIPC countries are relatively stable throughout. Figure 7 
suggests that after 1994 official net transfers per GDP dropped significantly for both HIPC 
and non-HIPC countries. The drop seems to have been more pronounced in HIPC 
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countries, though. More recently, official net transfers as a share of GDP have increased 
significantly more for HIPC countries.   
Table 4 reports the results for official net transfers. As was the case for ODA, official net 
transfers before 1996 are significantly higher for HIPC countries than for non-HIPCs, 
regardless of estimation technique. The fixed effects approach suggests that HIPC still 
received higher transfers than non-HIPC countries (about 2% of GDP). The coefficient of 
post96 confirms what we see in figure 7, namely that the overall level of official net transfers 
dropped after 1994. The policy dummies are mostly positive, but none are robustly 
significant in the expected direction. This suggests again, that policy performance – even if 
evaluated directly and within the HIPC initiative – seems to matter little! 
Official net transfers respond positively and significantly to a higher debt stock per GDP. 
For each one percent (per GDP) increase in debt stock, a country receives between 1.5% 
and 3% more official net transfers. Neither debt service nor debt stock reduction has any 
robustly significant effect. This means that aid budgets did not respond to debt relief, hence 
there is additionality. The freedom variable is significant and negative for all three 
techniques. A more democratic country receives between 0.5 % (random effects and fixed 
effects) and 1.5 % (OLS) more transfers per GDP. The share of population shows the same 
behavior as before: significant and positive for OLS and random effects, but significant and 
negative for fixed effects. Finally, relatively wealthier countries (higher GDP) receive fewer 
transfers, again consistent with our expectations.  
4.3  Aggregate Net Transfers 
As suggested by figure 9, aggregate net transfers per GDP are higher in HIPC countries for 
the time period considered, but there is a significant drop for the period 1996-2002 especially 
for HIPC countries. Comparing Figures 7 and 9 suggests that the drop in aggregate net 
transfers is driven by the drop in official net transfers
31. 
                                                      
31 When running a regression (not reported) with the difference between aggregate net transfers and official net 
transfers (i.e., non-official transfers) as the dependent variable, the coefficients on hipc, hipc96 and post96 are not 
significant. 
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In 1989-1995, aggregate net transfers are between 3.8% and 5.6% of GDP higher for HIPC 
countries than for non-HIPCs. This difference decreases for the 1996-2002 period by 
between 2.3% and 3% of GDP under OLS. sing random effects, there is no significant 
change. Even though the policy performance coefficients are mostly positive, only a few are 
significant for some specifications. Hence, overall, policy mattered little. Higher 
indebtedness leads again to bigger transfers. The coefficient on log(GDP) is consistently 
negative and relatively robust, meaning that poorer countries receive more transfers . As 
with official net transfers, more democratic countries receive higher aggregate transfers.  
 
5 Conclusion 
The empirical analysis yields several important results. First, good policy performance in the 
HIPC initiative has little or no effect on either official and aggregate net transfers or official 
development assistance. This result is consistent with earlier literature showing that aid 
allocation is driven by strategic and political, rather than developmental interests. Second, the 
HIPC initiative has not brought about a dramatic change in transfer flows to HIPC and non-
HIPC countries. In general, HIPC countries still receive higher aid flows than non-HIPCs, 
even though the gap has narrowed in some instances. Third, debt relief did not impact aid 
inflows to low-income countries. Hence, debt relief provides additional resources since 
donors did not cut aid flows by the amount of debt relief provided. Also, debt relief has not 
significantly decreased ODA nor official and aggregate net transfers.  
Taken together, these results have important policy implications. While aid flows declined 
significantly throughout the 1990s, my results indicate that donors’ selectivity did not 
increase. That is, there is little evidence that aid allocation is driven by developmental rather 
than strategic and political interests. Furthermore, aid effectiveness can be increased by more 
selective behavior on the donors’ side. Since debt relief in our sample did not lead to a 
crowding out of aid flows, deeper debt relief might not necessarily have detrimental effects 
on the aid level either. Additionally, removing the debt overhang completely corrects 
distorted incentives. Aid effectiveness can be increased significantly by providing more debt 
relief overall, and thereby “freeing up” foreign aid flows that were previously used for aid 
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recycling. These aid flows can then be allocated to countries with better macroeconomic 
policies.  
The remaining results are largely consistent with earlier literature. Official development 
assistance is higher for countries that have a higher debt service burden, lower GDP, and are 
classified as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. And countries with more political freedom 
and lower GDP receive higher aggregate net transfers. However, in contrast to earlier 
research, I find no small country bias in terms of aid and transfer inflows.  
It is too early to judge the success of the HIPC debt initiative. The five countries that have 
emerged successfully from the initiative have done so only recently. It remains to be seen 
whether the current debt levels of these countries are sustainable. 
 
20Revised: January 2005 
References 
Acemoglu, Daron (2003). Root Causes. “A Historical Approach to Assessing the Role of 
Institutions in Economic Development”, Finance and Development, June, pp.26-30. 
Alesina, Alberto, and David Dollar (2000). “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?”, 
Journal of Economic Growth, 5, March, pp.33-63. 
Arslanalp, Serkan, and Peter B. Henry (2004a). “Is Debt Relief Efficient?”, NBER Working 
Paper no.10217, January. 
Arslanalp, Serkan, and Peter B. Henry (2004b). “Helping the Poor to Help Themselves: 
Debt Relief or Aid?”, NBER Working Paper no.10230, January. 
Berlage, Lode, Danny Cassimon, Jacques Drèze and Paul Reding (2000). “Prospective Aid 
and Indebtedness Relief: A proposal”, Core Discussion Paper 2000/32. 
Birdsall, Nancy, Stijn Claessens, and Ishac Diwan (2002a). “Will HIPC matter? The Debt 
Game and Donor Behavior in Africa”, WIDER Discussion Paper No. 2002/50, May. 
Birdsall, Nancy, John Williamson, and Brian Deese (2002b). “Delivering on Debt Relief: From 
IMF Gold to a New Aid Architecture”, Washington, D.C.: Institute for International 
Economics. 
Birdsall, Nancy, Stijn Claessens, and Ishac Diwan (2003). “Policy Selectivity Forgone: Debt 
and Donor Behavior in Africa”. Center for Global Development Working Paper no.17. 
Boone, Peter (1996). “Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid”, European Economic 
Review 40, pp.289–329. 
Boote, Anthony R., and Kamau Thugge (1997). “Debt Relief for Low-Income Countries and 
the HIPC Initiative”, IMF Working Paper 97/24.  
Bulow, Jeremy (2002). “First World Governments and Third World Debt”, Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity, pp.229-254. 
 
21Revised: January 2005 
Burnside, Craig., and David Dollar (2000). “Aid, Policies, and Growth,” American Economic 
Review, 90(4), pp.847-867. 
Chang, Charles C., Eduardo Fernandez-Arias, and Luis Serven (1998). “Measuring Aid 
Flows: A New Approach”, available online on the World Bank webpage at 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/abschang.htm.  
Claessens, Stijn, Enrica Detragiache, Ravi Kanbur, and Peter Wickham (1997). “Analytical 
Aspects of the Debt Problems of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries”, in Zubair Iqbal and 
Ravi Kanbur (eds.): External Finance for Low-Income Countries, IMF.  
Coate, Stephen (1995). “Altruism, The Samaritan’s Dilemma, and Government Transfer 
Policy”, American Economic Review 85(4), March, pp.46-57. 
Cohen, Daniel (2000). “The HIPC Initiative: True and False Promises”, OECD Development 
Centre Technical Paper no.166, September. 
Collier, P., and D. Dollar. (1998). “Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction.” Policy Research 
Working Paper 2041. The World Bank. Washington, DC. 
Cordella, T., and G. Dell’Ariccia (2002). “Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction 
Programs,” IMF Staff Papers, Special Issue, Vol. 49, pp.68-86. 
Cordella, T., and G. Dell’Ariccia (2003). “Budget Support versus Project Aid," IMF Working 
Paper 03/88. 
Cordella, Tito, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, and Kenneth M. Kletzer (2003). “Conditional Aid, 
Sovereign Debt, and Debt Relief”, IMF, mimeo. 
Daseking, Christina, and Julie Kozack (2003). “Avoiding Another Debt Trap: Low-Income 
Countries Need a Sustainable Borrowing Strategy if They Are To Achieve Development 
Goals”, Finance  and Development, December, pp.20-23. 
Daseking, Christina, and Robert Powell (1999). “From Toronto Terms to the HIPC 
Initiative: A Brief History of Debt Relief for Low-Income Countries”,. IMF Working Paper 
99/142. Washington, DC: IMF. 
 
22Revised: January 2005 
Deininger, Klaus, and Lyn Squire, (1997). “Economic Growth and Income Inequality: 
Reexamining the Links”, Finance and Development, March, pp.38-41. 
Dollar, David, and William Easterly (1999). “The Search for the Key: Aid, Investment, and 
Policies in Africa”. Washington, DC: World Bank, Development Research Group, mimeo. 
Drazen, Allan M. (2000). “Political Economy in Macroeconomics”, Princeton University Press, pp. 
581-514. 
Easterly, William (1999). “How Did Highly Indebted Poor Countries Become Highly 
Indebted? – Reviewing Two Decades of Debt Relief”, Policy Research WP 2225. Washington, 
DC: World Bank, Development Research Group. 
Easterly, W., (2001). “The Elusive Quest for Growth”, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Easterly, William (2003). “Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
17(3), pp. 23-48, Summer. 
Easterly, William, and Ross Levine (1997). “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic 
Divisions”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), November, pp.1203-1250. 
Edison, Hali (2003). “Testing the Links: How Strong are the Links between Institutional 
Quality and Economic Performance?”, Finance and Development, June, pp.35-37. 
Freedom House (2004). “Freedom in the World Annual Country Ratings, 1972 through 
2003”, available online at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm.  
International Monetary Fund and World Bank (2002). “HIPC Initiative: Status of 
Implementation”, April, available online on the International Monetary Fund web page at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/2002/status/041202.pdf 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank (1998). “The Initiative for Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries: Review and Outlook”, DC/98-15, Development Committee, September. 
Kanbur, Ravi, Todd Sadler, and Kevin M. Morrison (1999). The Future of Development 
Assistance, Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council. 
 
23Revised: January 2005 
Killick, Tony, and Howard White (2001). “African Poverty at the Millennium: Causes, 
Complexities, and Challenges”, Washington, DC: World Bank, mimeo. 
Krugman, Paul R. (1988). “Financing vs. Forgiving A Debt Overhang”, Journal of Development 
Economics 29, 1988, pp.253-268. 
Maizels, Alfred, and Machiko K. Nissanke (1984), “Motivations for Aid to Developing 
Countries”, World Development, 12, 9: 879–900. 
McKinlay, Robert D. (1978). “The German Aid Relationship: A Test of the Recipient Need 
and Donor Interest Models of the Distribution of German Bilateral Aid, 1961-70”. European 
Journal of Political Research, 6: pp.235-57. 
McKinlay, Robert. D. and R. Little (1979). “The US Aid Relationship: A Test of the 
Recipient Need and the Donor Interest Models”, Political Studies, XXVII, 2: 236–50. 
OECD (2004). International Development Statistics 2004 (CD-Rom). 
Pattillo, Catherine, Hélène Poirson, and Luca Ricci, 2002. External Debt and Growth, IMF 
Working Paper 02/69, April. 
Powell, Robert, (2003). “Debt Relief, Additionality, and Aid Allocation in Low-Income 
Countries”, IMF Working Paper 03/175, September. 
Renard, Robrecht, and Danny Cassimon (2001). “On The Pitfalls of Measuring Aid’”, 
WIDER Discussion Paper 2001/69. Helsinki: UNU/WIDER. 
Rodrik, Dani, and Arvind Subramanian (2003). “The Primacy of Institutions (And What 
This Does and Does Not Mean)”, Finance and Development, June, pp.31-34. 
Rogoff, Kenneth S. (2003). “Unlocking Growth in Africa. Aid for Humanitarian Purposes is 
Desperately Needed, But It Cannot Be The Engine of Growth”, Finance and Development, 
June, p.56f. 
Sachs, Jeffrey (1986). “The Debt Overhang of Developing Countries”, in: Calvo, Guillermo 
et al., Debt, Stabilization, and Development: Essays in Memory of Carlos Diaz-Alejandro, pp.80-102. 
 
24Revised: January 2005 
Sachs, Jeffrey D. (2002). “A New Global Effort to Control Malaria”, Science 298, October, 
pp.122-124. 
Sachs, Jeffrey, Kwesi Botchway, Maciej Cuchra, and Sara Sievers (1999). “Implementing 
Debt Relief for the HIPCs”, Harvard University, Center for International Development, 
mimeo. 
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Pia Malaney (2002) “The Economic and Social Burden of Malaria”, 
Nature 415, February, pp.680-685. 
Schraeder, Peter J., Bruce Taylor, and Steven W. Hook (1998). “Clarifying the Foreign Aid 
Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows”, World 
Politics, 50(2), February, pp. 294-323. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E., and Lyn Squire (1998). “International Development: Is It Possible?”, 
Foreign Policy, pp.138-151, Spring. 
Williamson, John (2003). “From Reform Agenda to Damaged Brand Name: A Short History 
of the Washington Consensus and Suggestions For What to Do Next”, Finance and 
Development, September, pp.10-13. 
World Bank (1998). Assessing Aid – What Works, What Doesn’t Work, and Why. World Bank 
Policy Research Report. New York: Oxford University Press. 
World Bank (2004a). Global Development Finance 2004. 
World Bank (2004b). World Development Indicators 2004.  
 
25Revised: January 2005 
6 Tables 







Central African Republic Cambodia
Chad Cape Verde
Congo Comoros

































26Revised: January 2005 
 
1989-1995 002 % change
Population (in Millions) 516.0 0 14.3
GDP (in Mio. USD) 139000 00 38.7
GDP per capita (USD) 269 60 21.3
GDP growth* 2.6 .0
Debt Stock* 139.0 0 1.7
Debt Stock Reduction* 0.4 0.0 -46.6
Debt Service* 3.8 .0 19.7
Debt Service Reduction* 1.3 0.0 -62.2
OECD Debt Relief* 0.8 0.2 7.2
Aggregate Net Transfers* 9.5 4.0 -16.6
Official Net Transfers* 8.9 3.2 -32.0
Official Development Assistance* 9.7 2.3 -48.7
* in percent of GDP (and weighted by population)
HIP
27
1996-2002 % change 1989-1995 1996-2
608.0 17.8 223.0 255.
175000 25.9 66200 918
288 6.8 297 3
4.3 4.0 3
107.0 -23.0 40.3 41.
1.4 262.8 0.0






C countries non-HIPC countries
 
Table 2a.  Descriptive Statistics 
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1989-1995 002 % change
Population (in Millions) 18.6 6 15.5
GDP (in Mio. USD) 4100 90 8.2
GDP per capita (USD) 220 49 -6.4
GDP growth* 4.3 .8
Debt Stock* 75.4 6 39.2
Debt Stock Reduction* 0.7 A
Debt Service* 3.7 6.9 13.8
Debt Service Reduction* 0.4 0.4 -36.7
OECD Debt Relief* 0.4 0.2 -59.8
Aggregate Net Transfers* 12.8 .9 -13.2
Official Net Transfers* 12.5 7.0 -22.7
Official Development Assistance* 17.0 .6 -13.3
* in percent of GDP
28
1996-2002 % change 1989-1995 1996-2
22.6 21.5 16.1 18.
6020 46.8 6000 64
266 20.8 373 3
0.2 4.1 0
62.5 -17.1 76.6 106.




11.4 -11.0 10.3 8
9.1 -27.3 9.0
11.1 -34.4 11.1 9
Uganda Ghana
Table 2b.  Descriptive Statistics for HIPCs Uganda and Ghana 
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Table 3.  Official Development Assistance 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
hipc 0.069*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.088*** 0.090***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.025) (0.026)
hipc96 -0.007 -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.025 -0.027 0.004 -0.001
(0.015) (0.009) (0.009) (0.019) (0.018) (0.010) (0.010)
post96 -0.031 -0.011 -0.013 -0.016 -0.013
(0.022) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
oDecPt -0.012 -0.022 -0.036***
(0.015) (0.021) (0.012)
oCmplPt -0.005 -0.016 -0.043*
(0.015) (0.023) (0.022)
oCmplPt & enhDecPt -0.015 -0.015 -0.054***
(0.017) (0.024) (0.020)
oCmplPt & enhCmplPt 0.036** 0.004 -0.019
(0.017) (0.026) (0.021)
enhDecPt 0.02 0.004 0.016
(0.016) (0.014) (0.012)
enhCmplPt 0.017 0.043 -0.009
(0.018) (0.041) (0.016)
Debt Service 0.442*** 0.425*** 0.458*** 0.461*** 0.638*** 0.634***
(0.074) (0.077) (0.064) (0.063) (0.058) (0.060)
Debt Stock -0.012 -0.012* 0.003 0.003 -0.027** -0.029**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013)
OECD Debt Relief 0.694*** 0.720*** 0.044 0.036 0.047 0.016
(0.212) (0.209) (0.056) (0.055) (0.154) (0.165)
log(GDP) -0.068*** -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.082*** -0.089***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.025) (0.025)
Share(population) 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.011*** -0.059** -0.062**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.025) (0.025)
freedom -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.077*** 1.636*** 1.652*** 1.592*** 1.601*** 2.349*** 2.530***
(0.016) (0.117) (0.121) (0.178) (0.181) (0.661) (0.639)
Observations 828 828 828 828 828 828 828
R-squared 0.18 0.57 0.56 0.83 0.82
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.Time dummies are included, but are not reported. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Definitions for "hipc_status"  
oDecPt = reached decision point in original HIPC initiative
oCmplPt = reached completion point in original HIPC initiative
oCmplPt+enhDecPt = reached completion point in original and decision point in enhanced HIPC initiative
oCmplPt+enhCmpPt = reached completion point in original and enhanced HIPC initiative
enhDecPt = reached decision point only in enhanced HIPC initiative
enhCmplPt = reached completion point only in enhanced HIPC initiative
Ordinary Least Squares Fixed Effects Random Effects
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Table 4.   Official Net Transfers 
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )
hipc 0.043*** 0.037** 0.039*** 0.040** 0.041**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.017)
hipc96 -0.011 -0.026** -0.022*** -0.007 -0.008 0.022** 0.021**
(0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
post96 -0.024 -0.006 -0.009 -0.055*** -0.046*** -0.049*** -0.052***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
oDecPt 0.007 0.026 -0.01
(0.014) (0.022) (0.012)
oCmplPt 0.001 0.002 -0.021
(0.014) (0.024) (0.019)
oCmplPt & enhDecPt -0.003 -0.001 -0.021
(0.026) (0.024) (0.015)
oCmplPt & enhCmplPt 0.066 0.044 0.029
(0.048) (0.027) (0.036)
enhDecPt 0.013 -0.028** 0.009
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
enhCmplPt 0.040** 0.067 0.009
(0.012) (0.043) (0.014)
Debt Service -0.066 -0.089 -0.089 -0.079 0.08 0.072
(0.051) (0.056) (0.060) (0.060) (0.062) (0.060)
Debt Stock 0.016* 0.015** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.022* 0.021*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.012)
Debt Service Reduction 0.037 0.031 0.022 0.004 0.04 0.038
(0.021) (0.021) (0.043) (0.042) (0.030) (0.030)
Debt Stock Reduction 0.149** 0.169*** 0.018 0.032 -0.003 0.005
(0.050) (0.042) (0.039) (0.039) (0.058) (0.050)
log(GDP) -0.045** -0.045*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.007 -0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.022) (0.022)
Share(population) 0.004** 0.004*** 0.006* 0.006* -0.086*** -0.082***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.022) (0.022)
freedom -0.014** -0.015*** -0.005* -0.005* -0.005** -0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.061*** 1.104** 1.111*** 1.111*** 1.111*** 0.725 0.737
(0.012) (0.085) (0.087) (0.130) (0.137) (0.545) (0.532)
Observations 828 828 828 828 828 828 828
R-squared 0.09 0.47 0.46 0.73 0.73
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.Time dummies are included, but are not reported. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Definitions for "hipc_status"  
oDecPt = reached decision point in original HIPC initiative
oCmplPt = reached completion point in original HIPC initiative
oCmplPt+enhDecPt = reached completion point in original and decision point in enhanced HIPC initiative
oCmplPt+enhCmpPt = reached completion point in original and enhanced HIPC initiative
enhDecPt = reached decision point only in enhanced HIPC initiative
enhCmplPt = reached completion point only in enhanced HIPC initiative
Ordinary Least Squares Fixed Effects Random Effects
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Table 5.   Aggregate Net Transfers 
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )
hipc 0.049*** 0.038** 0.044*** 0.054*** 0.056***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.019) (0.020)
hipc96 -0.013 -0.030** -0.023** -0.024 -0.019 -0.005 -0.005
(0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
post96 -0.015 0.005 0 -0.026 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018)
oDecPt -0.007 0 -0.02
(0.021) (0.029) (0.012)
oCmplPt 0.018 -0.011 -0.006
(0.019) (0.032) (0.015)
oCmplPt & enhDecPt 0.029 0.016 -0.008
(0.027) (0.032) (0.018)
oCmplPt & enhCmplPt 0.101 0.074** 0.054
(0.057) (0.037) (0.041)
enhDecPt 0.030* 0.014 0.019
(0.015) (0.019) (0.014)
enhCmplPt 0.071** 0.09 0.012
(0.016) (0.058) (0.018)
Debt Service -0.078 -0.126 -0.129 -0.137* 0.024 0.008
(0.081) (0.087) (0.080) (0.079) (0.082) (0.079)
Debt Stock 0.016* 0.015* 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.01 0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.018) (0.018)
Debt Service Reduction 0.007 -0.002 -0.031 -0.033 0.015 0.011
(0.025) (0.025) (0.057) (0.057) (0.036) (0.035)
Debt Stock Reduction 0.166** 0.195*** 0.054 0.062 -0.037 -0.021
(0.050) (0.046) (0.053) (0.052) (0.060) (0.046)
log(GDP) -0.049** -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.014 -0.016
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.030) (0.029)
Share(population) 0.005** 0.005*** 0.007* 0.007* -0.023 -0.014
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.025) (0.025)
freedom -0.010** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.007* -0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.055*** 1.165** 1.196*** 1.159*** 1.153*** 0.565 0.55
(0.014) (0.102) (0.103) (0.153) (0.158) (0.702) (0.683)
Observations 828 828 828 828 828 828 828
R-squared 0.07 0.37 0.35 0.63 0.63
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.Time dummies are included, but are not reported. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Definitions for "hipc_status"  
oDecPt = reached decision point in original HIPC initiative
oCmplPt = reached completion point in original HIPC initiative
oCmplPt+enhDecPt = reached completion point in original and decision point in enhanced HIPC initiative
oCmplPt+enhCmpPt = reached completion point in original and enhanced HIPC initiative
enhDecPt = reached decision point only in enhanced HIPC initiative
enhCmplPt = reached completion point only in enhanced HIPC initiative
Ordinary Least Squares Fixed Effects Random Effects
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Figure 9: 
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